INTRODUCTION
The recent reintroduction of trial by jury in both Russia (1993) and Spain (1995) is interesting for two reasons. First, it is a surprising reversal in the longterm trend toward the elimination of the classic jury in favor of either courts composed exclusively of professional judges, or of "mixed courts" in which professional judges and lay assessors collegially decide all questions of fact, law, and sentence. Second, it raises the question whether the jury can act as a catalyst in the reform of Continental European criminal procedure, as it did during the nineteenth century in the wake of the French Revolution.
The modern notions of procedural fairness in criminal procedure, which have gained general international recognition in national constitutions and international human rights conventions, have their origins in the following Anglo-American concepts, which developed in the context of an adversarial trial by jury: (l) the presumption of innocence, (2) the privilege against selfincrimination, (3) the equality of arms, (4) the right to a public and oral trial, (5) the accusatory principle, and (6) the judge's independence from the executive or investigative agency. The classic separation of powers within the adversarial criminal process between a neutral judge, responsible for deciding questions of law and punishment, and a panel of lay persons responsible for questions of fact and guilt, also gave rise to common law rules of evidence. For instance, the separation of powers inspired the regulation of hearsay and relevance, the creation of exclusionary rules addressing excessively prejudicial and illegally gathered evidence, 1 and the adoption of the principle of "free evaluation of the evidence" unfettered by formal rules of evidence.
2 Important devel-lay assessors, collectively responsible for all questions of law, fact, guilt, and sentence.
The tension between the principles and the structure of the jury system it has produced in these civil law nations raises significant questions. To what extent are the universally accepted principles derived from common law criminal procedure dependent on the classic separation of powers in an adversarial jury trial?
8 Can a judge, who has studied the investigative file and determined, before the trial, that it includes sufficient evidence for a finding of guilt, preserve the presumption of innocence and act as an impartial fact/guilt finder? 9 Is the classic jury system a useful catalyst for cementing the independence of the judge from the executive or investigative branch in order to provide a foundation for an objective "ascertainment of the truth"? 10 If the judge has a duty to uncover the truth and the defendant invokes his or her right to remain silent, how effective is this right when the judge is also the finder of guilt? 11 What is the meaning of intime conviction, the French rendition of a "verdict according to one's conscience," in a "mixed court," where the presiding judge has unique access to the dossier and is responsible for drafting the judgment (even in the 8. For the proposition that French and German reformers, enamored with the Anglo-American jury system, lost sight of the "interdependencies" between that system and the procedural and evidentiary maxims of the adversary system, which were otherwise rejected, see Karl H. Kunert . Mittermaier felt the principle of oral and public trials could be effectively implemented only in the form of the classic jury trial.
9. Mittermaier doubted that judges, despite their best effort, could protect themselves from forming an unconscious "preconceived opinion as to guilt" imbued by study of the dossier of the preliminary investigation. See MITTERMAIER, DAS VOLKSGERICHT, supra note 8, at 22; MITTERMAIER, ERFAHRUNGEN, supra note 8, at 683. Modern German views range from the ultra-pessimistic contention that German criminal procedure is a Potemkin facade and the trial an orchestrated blessing of the results of the preliminary investigation, see Schünemann, supra note 7, at 482-83, to cautious assertions that the preliminary study of the file, while strongly influencing the presiding judge, does not make him or her incapable of objectively weighing the trial evidence, see CHRISTOPH RENNIG, DIE ENT-SCHEIDUNGSFINDUNG DURCH SCHÖFFEN UND BERUFSRICHTER IN RECHTLICHER UND PSY-CHOLOGISCHER SICHT 177, 223, 237, tbl. 10 (1993) (This document was unavailable to staff editors for cite-checking because it could not be retrieved from an archive.); cf. Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 544 (1973) .
10. In the Netherlands, the "pre-prepared version of the truth" is presented to the trial judge in the form of the investigative dossier. , 1995) . The "Schulterschluß" between the trial judge and the prosecutor, and the "systematic distortion of the processing of information, caused by the judicial reconstruction of an historical situation" all constitute, according to its critics, "weaknesses of truth-finding hindered by inquisitorial procedure with an accusatory facade." See Schünemann, supra note 7, at 475-76, 479.
11. This question is answered by the fact that continental defendants virtually never remain silent during the preliminary investigation or the trial itself. See MIRJAN DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 128 (1986) ; Damaška, supra note 9, at 527. unlikely event he or she has been overruled by the lay assessors) in such a way as to withstand the formal requirements of appellate scrutiny? 12 This comparison of the provisions of the 1993 Russian Jury Law 13 and the 1995 Spanish Jury Law 14 will focus on the effect of their implementation and reintroduction of the classic jury system on these questions and problems. 15 The most notorious case to be prosecuted in either country, the case of Mikel Otegi, exemplifies the fragility of the new jury systems. Mikel Otegi, a young Basque nationalist, murdered two Basque policemen and was acquitted on March 7, 1997, on the grounds of diminished capacity caused by intoxication and uncontrollable rage provoked by alleged previous police harassment. The acquittal shocked the Spanish public, prompting calls to amend or repeal the jury law, or at least to suspend it in the Basque Country.
12. As to the problems inherent in the presiding judge explaining the reasoning of the lay assessors, especially if he or she has been outvoted by them, see Damaška, supra note 9, at 540, 543. As to how the freie Beweiswürdigung of the judge, through the necessity of its having to be based in "rules of logic, experience of the laws of nature . . . and . . . probability," has led to the re-emergence of new "formal rules of evidence," which it was supposed to have replaced, see id. at 540; DAMAŠKA, supra note 11, at 20, 55; Kunert, supra note 8, at 124. On the "guesswork" involved in the formulation of the judgment in mixed courts, see DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 42-43. In his early writings, Mittermaier warned against "declaring legally-educated judges to be jurors" by allowing them to decide by freie Beweiswürdigung, because this permission would place too much power into their hands. Trial by jury was introduced in Russia during Alexander II's judicial reforms of 1864 and survived, despite subsequent legislation removing political and press crimes from its jurisdiction, until the Bolsheviks abolished it in 1917.
17
Article 125 of the post-Franco Spanish Constitution of 1978 provided for public participation in the administration of justice through the institution of trial by jury. 18 This provision was conceived as the key to democratic reform of the criminal justice system following the Franco dictatorship. 19 However, between 1978 and 1995, the majority of Spanish jurists questioned the appropriateness of using the classic jury system as a catalyst for criminal justice reform. They stressed the perceived inadequacies of the Spanish jury experience after 1888 and maintained either that Article 125 made lay participation optional, 20 or even if Article 125 made lay participation a constitutional mandate, that the "mixed jury" or escabinado would be constitutionally adequate as the equivalent of the modern form of popular participation (following the models of Germany, France, Italy, and Portugal). JURADO 33-34 (1996) ). Prosecutors and courts in Spain have assiduously avoided jury trials for such minor offenses. Fifty-seven of the first 75 trials in Spain of which the In Russia and the United States, the defendant may waive his or her procedural right to trial by jury. In Russia, a large portion of defendants waive their right to a jury trial, in favor of being tried by the traditional court of lay assessors or by a three-judge panel. 27 In Spain, on the other hand, jury courts have exclusive jurisdiction because the right to a jury trial embodies the citizens' right to participate in the administration of justice as jurors.
IV COMPOSITION OF THE JURY COURT
The jury court is composed of nine jurors and two alternates in Spain and twelve jurors and two alternates in Russia. One professional judge presides over the court in both countries.
28
Voter registration lists serve as the source for prospective jurors in both Spain and Russia. 29 Although the right to vote inures at age eighteen in both countries, Russia has restricted jury eligibility to registered voters who are twenty-five years of age or older. 30 Both countries exempt certain public officials, as well as officials in the legal and law enforcement professions, and allow discretionary excuses for age, hardship, or illness.
31
In both countries, the jury for a particular case is selected from at least twenty prospective jurors who have been preliminarily screened and summoned to the court on the day of trial. 32 After brief questioning of the juror's ability to be fair and impartial in the case, 33 The Russian jury law did not introduce changes in the procedure of the preliminary investigation, in which a legally trained official in the Ministry of the Interior or the Procurary independently and inquisitorially (that is, guided by a duty to seek the truth) collects evidence and determines whether a charge will be referred to the Procuracy for indictment. 35 The Spanish Jury Law, on the other hand, has provided for the active participation of both the defense and the prosecution following the investigative judge's determination that the crime charged is subject to the jury court's jurisdiction. 36 Once the parties are notified of the court's jurisdiction, the law provides for adversarial proceedings in which the parties may solidify their accusatory and defense pleadings and request further investigative measures.
37
The preliminary hearing in Spain is conducted by the investigative judge and is considered an extension of the preliminary investigation. The hearing takes place after the performance of indispensable investigative acts and the defendant's submission of a provisional response to the accusatory pleadings.
38
At the hearing, the parties may request that the investigative judge perform further investigative acts, move to dismiss the charges or the entire accusation, or amend the charges to include a separate crime related to the "justiciable facts."
39 If the evidence is sufficient to charge the defendant with a crime subject to the jury court's jurisdiction, the judge issues an order setting the defendant's case for trial. 38. See LOTJ arts. 30-31. Unlike the procedure in nonjury trials, where the investigative judge must investigate the alleged crimes "with all the circumstances which could influence its qualification and the guilt of the criminals," L.E. CRIM. art. 299, the jury procedure provides for investigation only upon motion of one of the parties, and only of subject matter relevant to probable cause to charge the crime, see LOTJ art. The Russian preliminary hearing is conducted by the trial judge, who reviews the entire dossier of the preliminary investigation before deciding whether to set the case for trial and what evidence will be admissible at trial. Though the hearing is adversarial in nature, no new evidence is adduced and rulings suppressing evidence must be based on the contents of the investigative dossier. If the judge determines that there is insufficient evidence to proceed to trial, he or she may dismiss the case. However, the more common remedy is for the judge to return the case to the investigator for supplementary investigation. 41 The Russian legislature has left the central role of the investigative dossier intact, but the Spanish legislature has modeled its preliminary hearing on that of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 42 by largely eliminating the investigative dossier from the trial to reinforce the principal of immediacy and orality of the trial in the jury court. 43 During the preliminary hearing, the investigative judge prepares a "trial file." This file includes evidence that cannot be repeated at trial or that needs to be ratified at trial, or other evidence the parties intend to use at trial.
44
The Russian constitutional prohibition against the use of evidence seized in violation of the Russian Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure has been remarkably implemented through the Russian preliminary hearing. 45 In particular, numerous defendants' admissions and confessions have been held inadmissible because they were elicited in violation of the defendant's right to 42. In Italy, however, the preliminary hearing judge (guidice per le indagini preliminari) is separate from the trial judge, presiding only over matters arising during investigation. This difference ensures a greater amount of structural independence. counsel, which adheres in capital investigations from the moment of arrest, 46 or because the suspect was not advised of his or her constitutional right to remain silent. 47 Russian courts have also explicitly applied the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine in suppressing certain evidence, such as semen or blood stains on clothing or objects that were not handled according to code specifications when they were gathered. 48 Motions to suppress evidence may also be made at trial, where witness testimony often reveals that evidence was illegally seized. Testimony regarding the motion is required. The illegality of investigative methods is often first revealed through witness testimony, and the parties may call additional witnesses in support of, or in opposition to, the motion. 49 Motions to suppress evidence which allege the violation of a fundamental right during the preliminary investigation are made in Spain in preliminary proceedings in the trial court. 50 The efficacy of this remedy has been doubted because the trial judge does not possess the full investigative dossier and there are no provisions for hearing oral testimony. 51 Thus, it is generally conceded that such motions will have to be resolved at trial, though, to the author's knowledge, defendants have made no such motions during the first year of jury cases. 52. According to the President of the Provincial Court of Málaga, Manuel Torres Vela, the lack of motions to suppress based on search and seizure violations has been due to the fact that no narcotics charges are heard by juries, and that the typical Spanish murder case, involving "crimes of passion" or bar-room fights, seldom involve searches or wiretaps. See id. at 284.
VI THE TRIAL A. The Changing Roles of the Participants
One of the key aims of the Russian legislature was to strip the trial judge of the inquisitorial duty of seeking the truth and to eliminate the accusatory role the Soviet-Russian procedure had imposed on the court. Therefore, the judge no longer reads the accusatory pleading nor dominates the questioning of the defendant and the witnesses in the new jury trials. The judge may no longer prevent the prosecutor's abandonment of the case, act as a prosecutor by necessity when the prosecutor does not appear for trial, nor return the case to the investigator on his or her own motion. 53 The Spanish criminal trial was perhaps the most adversarial on the European Continent even before the passage of the jury law. 54 Although the Spanish jury law kept the trial procedure basically unchanged, the trial judge's ability to control the collection of evidence has been drastically impeded by the lack of access to the investigative dossier. The trial begins not only with the reading of the prosecution's accusatory pleadings, but also with the pleadings of the defendant and the private prosecutor, usually representing the alleged victim, the victim's family, or their representatives. 55 Russian and Spanish jury trials are greatly impacted by the empowerment of the victim or aggrieved party in criminal procedure. 56 In both countries, a prosecutorial motion to dismiss may be granted only if the aggrieved (the private prosecutor) agrees. 57 In the Russian trial, the aggrieved is usually uneducated, not represented by counsel, and often has no knowledge of the investigation and evidence. The aggrieved party has had a disturbing effect in many trials by displaying unpredictable outbursts of emotion, blurting out inadmissible or suppressed evidence, and necessitating laborious explanations by the 53. See Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 199-201. I have criticized the judge's excessive discretion to remand a case for further investigation even after the jury has been sworn and has heard evidence. Such practice violates the presumption of innocence and the right to one's lawful judge, as guaranteed by judge about every aspect of the proceeding. 58 Whereas the Russian Supreme Court has winked at the victim's illegal disclosure of the defendant's prior criminal record to the jury to the point of affirming a death sentence in the face of such a procedural error, 59 it has reversed acquittals because the trial judge continued the case in the absence of the aggrieved party.
60
In Spain, the aggrieved party is invariably represented by counsel in the trial and has had a strong impact on the jury in several of the first cases. In particular, the presence of the aggrieved in the courtroom has weakened the defendant's supposed advantages in being the sole "common citizen" arguing to a jury of his peers against the prosecutor, the representative of the state. The presence of the victim's counsel has created a "good cop-bad cop" situation, where the public prosecutor pursues a "just resolution" of the case and the private prosecutor screams for blood.
61
This situation also allows the victim's counsel to push a certain theory of the case primarily aimed at a greater monetary award. 61. In the first case in Granada, the prosecutor and the defense asked the jury to acquit a 71-yearold woman on insanity grounds after all three psychiatric experts agreed she was completely irresponsible when she stabbed her 86-year-old neighbor to death. The private prosecutor asked for a guilty verdict based on partial lack of responsibility, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 397-99. The private prosecutor invariably requests a higher prison sentence and damages than the public prosecutor and sometimes pleads more serious criminal charges. See id. at 399-400.
62. In the second Barcelona trial, the private prosecutor was represented by a former television personality who was successful in convincing the jury that the defendant was guilty of only attempted murder of a taxi-driver, in order to support his civil suit for 50 million pesetas against the city government and the taxi company for causing the death by being dilatory in getting an ambulance to the scene. In Spain, the parties, including the victim, are allowed to make an opening statement, following the reading of the pleadings. The statement grants the parties an opportunity to explain their pleadings, list the facts they believe will be proved, and state the verdict and sentence they believe will be just; they may even propose the hearing of new evidence. 65 The Russian legislation does not provide the parties with the same opportunity.
C. Pleas of Guilty
In both countries, the defendant is first asked if he or she admits the charges brought against him or her.
66
In Spain, pleas of guilty conforming to the pleadings and the longest requested sentence of either the prosecutor or the private prosecutor are permitted in jury and nonjury trials if the sentence does not exceed six years of deprivation of liberty and there is no question as to the presence of a corpus delicti for the crime or any objection from the defense counsel. Upon reaching conformity, or conformidad, the trial is terminated and sentence is imposed. 67 The Spanish practice of conformidad is similar to one of the new Italian forms of abbreviated procedures, the applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti. 68 Coupled with the early and active adversarial participation of the defense, prosecution, and victim in both the preliminary criminal investigation and the trial, the practice is the best example of a "reprivatization of the criminal law" on the basis of a consensual model proposed by some German commentators. 69 Although the Russian law allows a defendant to plead guilty before the jury and condones, with the consent of the judge and all the parties, an abbreviated trial or even the taking of no evidence, the jury must still deliberate and decide the defendant's fate.
D. The Taking of the Evidence
Trials in both countries begin with an admonition to the defendant of his right not to testify and his privilege against self-incrimination. 71 If the defendant waives these rights, the prosecutor begins the examination of the defendant. 72 The defendant has given a statement waiving his or her right to testify and to avoid self-incrimination in nearly all of the first Spanish trials. The same was true in all but one of the first 114 Russian trials, though some judges allowed the defendant to hear the prosecution's case before deciding whether to testify, as is the practice in the United States. For criminal justice systems that place emphasis on the presumption of innocence, the prosecution's burden of proof, and the defendant's right to remain silent, the interrogation of the defendant before any incriminating evidence has been presented to the factfinder is a lingering inquisitorial vestige in these two systems.
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In both Russian and Spanish jury trials, the questioning of the witnesses is initially left to the parties, with the opponents having a right to cross-examine. The judge intervenes only after the parties have finished their questioning. 74 Russian judges have maintained a dominant, inquisitorial role much more so than their Spanish counterparts. 75 Both jury laws allow jurors to submit writ-70. See UPK RSFSR art. 446. A jury acquitted a Russian man of capital murder and rape after his guilty plea. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 104-05, 159-60. In the pre-revolutionary Russian jury system, Russian defendants used to plead guilty and express their remorse, winning an acquittal from the jury. For instance, one woman, charged with attempting to poison her husband, ignored her lawyer's advice to plead guilty and denied the charges in her testimony. The jury convicted her and sentenced her to hard labor in Siberia. When her lawyer asked why she did such a stupid thing, she replied that if she were acquitted, she would have to go back to living with her husband! See N.P TIMOFEEV, SUD PRISIAZHNYKH V ROSSII. SUBEBNYE OCHERKI 23-25 (1881). (This document was unavailable to staff editors for cite-checking because it could not be retrieved from an archive.) In up to 95% of all criminal cases in the United States, the defendant elects to waive his right to trial by jury and enters a "plea bargain" in exchange for a sentence guaranteed to be less than if the defendant had gone to trial and was convicted. ten, unobjectionable questions to be asked by the presiding judge. 76 The Russian jury law does not attempt to limit the jury court's access to the preliminary investigation file, nor to regulate the use of prior statements of witnesses or defendants included therein. 77 In Spain, however, the trial judge does not conduct the preliminary hearing and the evidentiary file is not physically present at the trial. Thus, the trial judge's knowledge, as well as that of the jurors, is restricted to the evidence introduced at trial. This difference in procedure effectively prevents a Spanish judge from assuming the inquisitorial role of his Russian counterpart.
Although the Spanish jury law allows the parties to question witnesses about prior statements that contradict their testimony at trial, these statements may not be read into evidence, nor are they admissible for the truth of the matter stated. 78 The new procedure has presented problems, however, for the lawyers. In the three murder trials I observed in Valladolid, Granada, and Cór-doba, the defendants, while testifying, denied that they remembered what happened on the day of the homicide. Without being able to use the statements from the preliminary investigation, prosecutors found it very difficult to impeach the alleged lack of memory of the defendants, leading to an interrogation confusing for jurors and audience alike.
79
The new Russian law prohibiting the introduction of illegally gathered evidence presents some complicated tactical problems for Russian defendants because jury acquittals can be appealed by the prosecutor or the aggrieved. First, many acquittals have been reversed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ("SCRF") because the trial judge excluded evidence which the high 76. See LOTJ art. 46(1). In a study of 54 cases in 1994, it was determined that jurors were much more active than lay assessors in Russian "mixed courts" in questioning witnesses and defendants. Of the questions asked by the court, 56% were asked by the presiding judge and 43% by the jurors. See M.V. NEMYTINA, ROSSIYSKIY SUD PRISIAZHNYKH 32 (1995). One Saratov judge noted that the more he let the parties examine the witnesses, the more jurors intervened with questions in response to the lawyers' inability to cover crucial areas of testimony effectively. 79. Even prior trial testimony is inadmissible in a retrial. Thus, in the first retrial of a Spanish jury case in Castellón, the defendant changed his testimony to improve his self-defense claim and the prosecution could not use his prior testimony because it was unsworn, as Spanish defendants are not required to testify under oath, and because the reversal of the defendant's conviction had rendered the case a "nullity." The defendant was acquitted the second time around. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 300 (citing Interview with Antonio Gastaldi Mateo, Public Prosecutor in the Castellón Provincial Court (June 20, 1997)). For detail on the banishment of the investigation dossier from the trial court and the problems it has caused, see Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 298-301.
court's Cassational Panel deemed admissible. 80 Thus, lawyers must carefully evaluate whether to move to exclude questionably prejudicial evidence. In addition, in some early trials, defense lawyers would sometimes wait until trial to move to exclude the evidence so the judge would not return the case for further investigation, and so the jury could hear the testimony about the unlawful tactics of criminal investigators. 81 In several cases, the Cassational Panel of the SCRF has reversed acquittals because the defense had unsuccessfully moved to exclude allegedly coerced confessions and then had, either through the testimony of the defendant, other witnesses, or through the defense lawyer's closing argument, alluded to the allegedly unlawful actions of the interrogators. 82 Finally, the Russian legislation prohibits mention of a defendant's past criminal record before the jury. 83 To achieve parity, the SCRF ruled en banc that the defendant may not introduce good character evidence before the jury. 83. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 103. For instance, the defendant's criminal record must be omitted from the reading of the indictment. See UPK RSFSR art. 446. On the other hand, the jury has received questions related to proving prior convictions of defendants in Spanish cases when the aggravating circumstance of recidivism is pleaded. Thus in the Ugal/Martínez case in the Barcelona Provincial Court, the jury proved four prior convictions for Ugal and nine for Martínez. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 347.
84. See SCRF Decision No. 9, supra note 49, ¶ 16. In the case of Gusiev/Poliakov, an acquittal for robbery-murder was reversed because the defense read records of the defendant's illness to the jury and told the jury that an earlier conviction had been reversed by the SCRF. See Supreme Court Deci-This ruling hinders the defense in presenting "sympathy" evidence to the jury inducing them to recommend leniency. Since "sympathy" evidence can help eliminate the possibility of the death penalty, its omission has been strongly criticized. 85 For example, the SCRF has even upheld the conviction of an arguably "battered" woman for the aggravated murder of her husband even though she was prevented from introducing evidence of his bad character. The court held that admission of such evidence would turn the case into a trial of the victim.
E. The Role of Judge and Jury in Rendering Judgment
Both the Russian and Spanish legislatures have rejected the AngloAmerican general verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty." Instead, Russia and Spain have followed the French model, later adopted by most Continental European countries in the nineteenth century, whereby the jury is presented with a list of questions or propositions.
87
Before arguments and the defendant's last word, the Spanish judge prepares a verdict form (objeto del veredicto) in the form of a list of propositions, some designated as favorable to the defendant, some as unfavorable. The jury must then decide whether they were proved or not proved during the trial. The propositions are restricted to the facts presented by the various parties during the trial and relate to the elements of the crimes charged, conditions which modify or exclude guilt, and statutory factors that aggravate or mitigate the defendant's criminal responsibility. Finally, the jury is asked to affirm or deny the proof of the defendant's guilt as to the "criminal acts" (hechos delictivos) contained in the parties' pleadings. If the jury believes that guilt has been proved as to one or more of the allegations, it may nevertheless recommend a suspension of sentence (remisión condicional de la pena) or ask that the government grant complete or partial amnesty for the offense (recomendación del indulto).
88
The judge's proposed verdict form must be discussed with the parties; the parties' objections to the form's contents may form the basis for an appeal. The Russian "question list" requires the posing of three basic questions: (l) whether the corpus delicti of the crime has been proved; (2) whether the defendant's identity as perpetrator of the crime has been proved; and (3) whether he or she is guilty of having committed the crime. 90 Both legislatures resorted to the "question list" verdict form to give the professional judge a factual foundation for the imposition of a reasoned judgment. The factual foundation is a statutory or constitutional requirement in both countries. 91 Both legislatures equivocated, however, on whether they actually wished to limit the jury to deciding mere "naked historical facts" or allowing it to make a finding of "guilty" or "not guilty" as to each charged offense. While the Russian statute prohibits the judge from posing questions which require "strictly juridical evaluations," it also requires the judge to instruct the jury on the substantive law as it applies to the acts imputed to the defendant, thus seeming to indicate that the jury is to apply the law to the facts. The SCRF, however, has interpreted the statutory language to reduce the jury to deciding only "naked historical facts," depriving it even of deciding "internal fact elements" or mens rea, by characterizing it as a "question of law."
92
Spanish courts have wrestled with similar problems. Most courts have tried to phrase questions of guilt in terms of the defendant's "having caused the death" of the victim and have eschewed using the nomen juris in their formulations. This has not been true in questions related to mitigating and aggravating circumstances, however, and juries have been asked directly whether a murder was committed with treachery (alevosía) or excessive cruelty (ensañamiento), often including definitions phrased in legal terminology within the question itself. Spanish courts have also not shied away from asking juries directly about the defendant's mental state, for example, whether a homicide was committed intentionally, recklessly, with gross negligence, with simple negligence, or accidentally. 93 According to some commentators, one of the main reasons for several of the more criticized verdicts in the country is jurors' hesitance to find "intent" in the domestic and bar-room "crimes of passion" typical of many 92. In SCRF's Opinion No. 9, supra note 49, ¶ 18, the Court held that the jury lacked competence to decide "juridical questions," such as whether a murder was intentional, negligent, or committed in the heat of passion or for financial gain, whether it was committed with a "hooliganistic" motivation, extreme cruelty, or excessive force in self-defense, or whether an act amounted to robbery or rape. I have criticized the jurisprudence of the SCRF, drawing on the pre-revolutionary practice and theory discussed in Stephen Thaman, Postanovka voprosov v sovremennom Rossiyskom sude prisiazhnykh, 10 ROSS. IUST. 8-11 (1995) [hereinafter Thaman, Postanovka voprosov]; see also Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 205-06. For similar criticism, see NEMYTINA, supra note 76, at 83. While mens rea is a "question of fact" for the jury to decide in U.S. trials, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently decided that it does not violate due process to statutorily prevent the jury from hearing evidence relevant to the proof of the defendant's mental state, for example, evidence of intoxication. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42-44 (1996) .
93. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 320-51, for a detailed study of the Spanish question lists. See id. at 335-46 on questions relating to mental states. Spanish homicides. This has led judges to instruct juries seriously as to the difference between intentional and reckless murder, as well as the difference between homicide with gross or simple negligence. 94 The Russian system separates the guilt question into three component parts, thereby permitting implicit jury nullification by allowing an acquittal even though the jury has determined that the corpus delicti and the defendant's perpetration of the criminal acts has been proved. In the famous Vera Zasulich case of 1878, the jury acquitted a young revolutionary sympathizer of shooting a Tsarist official by availing itself of this option of a "not guilty" verdict, even though all of the elements of the crime had been proved. 95 Spanish law treats contradictions between the questions of corpus delicti, the identity of the perpetrator and guilt as a defect in the verdict which the jury is instructed to correct.
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The Spanish system is more explicit in reducing the jury's role in determining "guilt" by limiting the scope of the jury's involvement to finding that the defendant committed a certain criminal act rather than a finding that a "crime" was committed in the juridical sense.
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The stricter "anti-nullification" approach of the Spanish legislature did not, however, prevent the stunning acquittal of Mikel Otegi of the murder of two policemen in the Basque Country. The jury was able to acquit the young man, despite clear evidence of an intentional double murder, because questions of mens rea, including questions of diminished capacity and insanity as a complete excuse for criminal conduct, are considered to be "questions of fact" for the jury to decide. Spain also permits a complete excuse on grounds of temporary insanity, even when caused by volun- 95. For discussions of pre-revolutionary Russian jury nullification in the context of the new statute, see Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 114-15; Thaman, Postanovka voprosov, supra note 92, at 9. In a case from the Ivanovo Region, a jury affirmatively answered the corpus delicti and perpetration questions. The victim had been stabbed to death, his woman friend, the defendant, had perpetrated the killing, and no legal excuses or justifications had been proved. Nevertheless, the jury found her "not guilty" of the murder and the SCRF upheld the judgment. See Thaman, Geschworenengerichte, supra note 15, at 79 n.66. In commenting on the SCRF decision affirming this case, the chief author of the jury law noted that one interpretation of the "not guilty" verdict under the Russian law is that "the act contains all the elements of the crime in its totality, but the jury, for reasons known to them, deprived the state of the right to achieve a conviction and apply the sanctions of the special part of the Penal Code." S.A. Pashin, Postanovka voprosov pered kollegiey prisiazhnykh zasedateley, in 1 SOST. PRAVO., supra note 47, at 89, 90-91.
96. See LOTJ art. 63(1)(d). This happened in the second Málaga trial, a prosecution for trespass and threats, in which the jury found the principle fact questions to be proved, yet returned a verdict of "not guilty." The judge returned the verdict for "correction," explaining its supposed contradictoriness, and the jury blithely found the principle fact questions (as to corpus delicti and perpetration) to be "not proved" and revalidated its acquittal. See Carmona Ruano & De Paúl, supra note 94, at 7. On the Spanish attempt to prevent jury nullification, see Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 376-80.
97. LOTJ art. 60(1) originally called for a finding of guilt or lack thereof as to each "charged crime" (delito imputado). In November 1995, the language was changed to "charged criminal act" (hecho delictivo imputado) to effect a clean separation of questions of law from questions of fact. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 336. Thus, as one critic noted, it is no longer a guilt-finding in the strict meaning of the word and is actually superfluous in the technical sense. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 378 n. 609 (citing GÓMEZ COLOMER, supra note 26, at 122).
tary intoxication or other causes. 98 In Russia, the judge must discharge the jury and initiate psychiatric commitment procedures if evidence of mental illness eliminating criminal responsibility arises.
99
Until the promulgation of a new penal code in 1996, the question of voluntary intoxication, a veritable national pastime in Russia, was only presented to the jury as a circumstance that aggravates the defendant's level of guilt. Despite this statutory aggravating factor, which also existed before the Russian Revolution, Russian jurors have tended to mitigate the responsibility of intoxicated defendants and have generally recommended lenience.
100
As in the first Russian trials, some Spanish judges have limited the propositions in the verdict form to those absolutely necessary to prove the elements of the offenses and the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, 101 whereas others have had the jurors affirm or reject virtually every assertion contained in the prosecution and defense pleadings. For example, of the fifty-four propositions submitted to the first Valladolid jury, several had no relation to important elements of the offense. 102 Interviews of the jury in the notorious Otegi case in San Sebastián revealed they had great trouble understanding the ninety-five questions submitted to them. 99. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 127. 100. Eighty-nine defendants in 76 of the first 109 Russian trials to reach a verdict were found to be intoxicated (an aggravating factor) at the time of commission of the crime. The jury recommended leniency to 47 of those defendants. Pre-revolutionary observers of jury trials in Russia also found that the "views of jurors about the condition of drunkenness at the moment of the commission of a crime are diametrically opposed to those provisions of the law dealing with this object." TIMOFEEV, supra note 70, at 381; cf. BOBRISHCHEV-PUSHKIN, EMPIRICHESKIE ZAKONY DEIATEL'NOSTI RUSSKOGO SUDA PRISIAZHNYKH 355-56 (1896) . (This document was unavailable to staff editors for cite-checking because it could not be retrieved from an archive.)
101. For example, only nine and six propositions, respectively, were submitted to the juries in the first murder cases in Palencia and Granada.
102. This subsequently elicited much criticism in the press, and the judge admitted the difficulty he had with the verdict in a newspaper interview. Following the preparation of the verdict form, the arguments of the parties, and the defendant's last word, the presiding judge in Spain instructs the jury in a restrained manner and in a form the jury can understand as to (1) the jury's function, (2) the content of the verdict form, (3) the nature of the facts under discussion, those that determine the circumstances constituting the crime(s) charged and those that refer to allegations of exclusion and modification of guilt, (4) the rules of deliberation and voting, and (5) the form of their final verdict.
104
The judge must be sure to maintain strict impartiality during the summation and must instruct the jurors not to consider any evidence declared inadmissible at trial. 105 The judge also instructs the jurors to resolve all doubts in favor of the defendant. 106 Spanish judges have differing views on whether they should instruct juries on the legal elements of the charged crimes, inasmuch as the law expressly restricts the jury to deciding solely whether the charged acts were committed. 107 Even though the SCRF has in fact reduced Russian jurors to judges of "naked acts," and does not even let them decide mens rea questions, the judge still gives a complete instruction on the substantive law during his or her summation. The judge is also required to summarize the evidence and the positions of the parties, 108 a practice adhered to in Spain from 1888 until 1931, when it was repealed because it was seen as tantamount to an ultimate accusation by the supposedly neutral bench at the end of the trial when no response was afforded to the defense. 109 Several convictions have been reversed by the SCRF because of the one-sidedness of the presiding judge's summation, or because he or she neglected to mention some of the evidence. , 1997) ). On the other hand, the judge in the first trial in Vitoria explained in the judgment how difficult it was to explain to the jury the difference between intentional murder, reckless murder, homicide with gross and simple negligence, and accident. 110. See Shurygin, supra note 82, at 7. A counsel's objection to a lack of objectivity in a summation must be on the record in order to preserve the issue on appeal. See UPK RSFSR art. 451. This objection should be made in the presence of the jury so as to give the judge a chance to correct any possible errors. See id. mation about the deliberations. 111 In Spain, seven of nine votes are required to prove any propositions unfavorable to the defendant, whereas only five votes are needed to prove any proposition favorable to the accused. Jurors are also allowed to alter the propositions submitted to them as long as they do not substantially alter the subject of their deliberations and the alterations do not result in an aggravation of the possible criminal responsibility of the defendant. 112 Similarly, "guilty" verdicts require seven votes while "not guilty" verdicts or recommendations of suspension of sentence and clemency require only five.
113
The jury can request more instructions or clarifications as to the verdict form, and if the jury has not voted after two days of deliberations, the judge can call them into court to determine whether they have had any problems understanding the verdict form.
114
While the detailed special verdicts used in Spanish and Russian cases certainly enable the sentencing and appellate judges to divine the reasoning process of the jury, Spain has gone one step further and required that the jury give a succinct rationale for their verdict, indicating the evidence upon which the verdict was based and the reasons for finding a particular proposition proved or not proved. 115 Other than a nonbinding statement by the jury provided for in the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, 116 this is the clearest attempt yet by a legislature to require that juries justify their verdicts.
While some juries gave fairly elaborate explanations of why they found a charge to be proven (for example, by explaining why they believed a witness, or did not believe the defendant, or by pointing to expert testimony), many juries just provided stock phrases like "testimony of witnesses and experts," or "evidence, experts, defendant ' Prior to the Otegi Case, some commentators opined that requiring juries to give reasons for acquittals would violate the presumption of innocence and the principal of "free evaluation of the evidence," since an appellate court, when reviewing a jury's verdict, need only affirm that objective elements of proof exist which could have permitted the jury to reach a certain conclusion. 119 Indeed, many of the acquittal verdicts were phrased in terms of doubt as to the sufficiency of the proof. 120 On June 27, 1997, however, the Superior Court of Justice of the Basque Country reversed the Otegi acquittal based on the insufficiency of the rationale given by the jury, believing that the jury had basically made just bald assertions of reasonable doubt. After lamenting that the jury did not give even a minimal explanation for its answers to the ninety-one factual questions, and provided only a "pseudo-motivation or substitute global motivation," the Court expounded:
The invocation of doubt and the references to that which the law requires-with which the jury pretends to support its answers, which they forgot to give reasons for before-reveal that the jury, camouflaging with perplexity a psychological state which has nothing to do with serious hesitation, invents the existence of a doubt which it gratuitously prejudges, in order to use the prop of Art. 54(3) of the law. Armed with the protection of this precept, the jury proclaims that it is plagued by doubt, that it finds it impossible to dissipate it and that, because of it, it is resolving the issue in the sense most favorable to the defendant. It does not describe from where the doubt arose, nor the magnitude thereof, nor is any notion apparent of the force employed to overcome the doubt or clear up the difficulties to which it has given rise. 121 To avoid deficiencies with the verdict, the jury may request that the secretary of the court help them in drafting the verdict. 122 Some commentators have seen this as the first step toward, or a subliminal recognition of what is in their opinion the superiority of the mixed court with lay assessors. 123 Indeed, in a few of the first trials, the legally trained secretary answered substantive legal questions posed by the jury. 124 After receiving the verdict from the jury, the judge must review the verdict for defects and ask the jury to make any necessary corrections. In a Spanish case, if the judge returns the jury three times to correct defects in the verdict, and they fail to do so, he or she may dissolve the jury and retry the case before a new jury. If the new jury also fails to reach a verdict due to similar problems, the judge must, on his or her own motion, enter a verdict of acquittal. 125 The judge's ruling following a guilty verdict in both countries must be based on the facts found to be true by the jury, which the judge then juridically qualifies before imposing sentence. 126 Spanish judges have expressed frustration at having to justify jury verdicts with which they do not agree, a situation which judges could face in mixed courts, in the unlikely event they were outvoted by the lay assessors. In a twenty-six-page judgment, the judge in the thirteenth Barcelona trial expressed his disagreement with a jury's finding that the defendant did not intend to kill, when he stabbed his female companion seven times in areas of her body containing vital organs. The judge lamented, "In the mind of the jurist a certain pain emerges, from the point of view of judicial technique" when one must justify a judgment when the facts "collide with the interpretative criteria which jurisprudence utilizes to determine the intentionality of an agent." 127 The judge in the second Córdoba trial criticized a jury's verdict which compelled him to sentence a man to thirty years in prison as "the sentiments of the common people, struggling in the nadir of a long process of decadence," and added, There are times when the soul is buffeted about by anxiety when the knowledge of ancestral criteria of the technical application of the law is brought down in an instant by simple inclinations of personal sensibility, replete with honesty, but nevertheless deprived of even the simplest sense of legal culture. 128 
VII

CONCLUSION
It is difficult to predict the future of trial by jury in either Russia or Spain. Despite a constitutional anchor in both countries, a decided lack of enthusiasm exists on the part of professors, judges, and lawyers as to whether it is an institution capable of helping to solve the problems plaguing the administration of justice. It also remains to be seen whether it will serve as a genuine catalyst in transforming the criminal trials in both countries into an adversarial proceeding, with increased orality and immediacy and less reliance on the investigative dossier.
Russia's new law has been in effect for five years as of November 1, 1998, yet the institution has not spread beyond the nine original regions.
129 From December 15, 1993 to July 1, 1997, approximately 978 jury trials, involving 1,719 defendants, reached a verdict. 130 Defendants requesting to be tried by a jury in jurisdictions subject to the Regional or Territorial Courts have risen from 20.5% in 1994, to 30.9% in 1995, 37.3% in 1996, and 36.8% in 1997, 131 indicating the increasing popularity of trial by jury at least within one part of the population. The acquittal rate, at 18.2% in 1994, fell to 14.3% in 1995, but then rose to 19.1% in 1996 and to 22.9% in 1997. 132 These numbers must be compared, however, to general acquittal rates of 1.3% in 1994 and 1.4% in 1995. 133 In addition, many of the jury trials ended in convictions for lesser offenses or in verdicts of lenience or special lenience. 134 The relative lenience of Russian juries can perhaps be explained as a reaction to an excessively severe Soviet criminal justice system, coupled with profound mistrust among the population of criminal investigators and police, who are known to engage in brutal coercive tactics in interrogation and are otherwise distrusted in their testimony. 135 The parties themselves becoming more active in the presentation of evidence and examination of witnesses may also have led to a higher acquittal rate.
The appellate jurisprudence of the SCRF has radically restricted the jury's power to decide issues of mens rea, the pivotal questions in most murder trials, and aggravating circumstances, which can trigger imposition of the death penalty. These issues include statutory aggravating circumstances, the issue of intention, affirmative defenses such as necessary defense or heat of passion, and others. 136 In 1994, the SCRF reversed 42.9% of all judgments and 20.1% of all acquittals, nine total. While the SCRF reversed only 31.5% of the judgments in broader appeal of acquittals, and (5) transforming the classic jury into a "mixed court." 144 The extreme lenience of Spanish law in allowing a defense of not guilty by reason of complete or temporary insanity, whether due to mental disease or defect, alcohol or drug intoxication, or even any other circumstance of analogous significance, 145 has led to the mounting of such defenses in many of the first cases.
146 While such defenses have been rejected by most juries, the Otegi acquittal could conceivably be an impulse for the Spanish legislature to amend its law concerning mental excuses as was done in California following the Dan White verdict and in the federal system following the John Hinckley verdict. This would be a clear example of how the presence of a jury of lay factfinders exercises influence on the definition of crimes and their defenses in the substantive criminal law.
Despite the requirement that murder and certain other cases throughout Spain be tried by jury, there have as of yet been remarkably few jury trials, with several provinces not having held a single trial as of May 27, 1997, the first anniversary of the first trials. 147 Prosecutors have been either charging lesser crimes or reaching agreements with defendants (conformidad) in the minor cases of threats, burglary, and bribery to avoid the jurisdiction of the jury court.
148
Even though there have been relatively few jury trials held to date, the reappearance of juries on the inquisitorial soil of Continental Europe is an important phenomenon, regardless of its reception among law professors, lawyers, judges, and politicians. It breathes life into the overly written, overly bureaucratic structure of European criminal jurisprudence and makes European jurists rethink the procedural and substantive tenets upon which their criminal justice systems are based.
